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Abstract 
How can quantitative easing (QE) work in the Eurozone (EZ)? We model the EZ as 
the aggregate of two countries characterised by New Keynesian output and 
inflation equations with a Tobinian money market equation that determines each 
country's interest rate as a spread above the common policy rate. High spreads 
determine negative output gaps and deflationary pressure. With the ECB policy 
rate at the zero lower bound, QE expands money supply throughout the EZ. We 
show that QE, if large enough, can indeed be effective by reducing country spreads 
and the ensuing output gaps. However, zero output and deflation gaps can be 
obtained for the EZ on average, but not for all single countries unless fully 
symmetric conditions are met. Therefore fiscal accommodation at the country level 
should also intervene, and we conclude that the coordination of fiscal and monetary 
policies is of paramount importance. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 The decision of the European Central Bank (ECB) to launch a 
quantitative easing (QE) programme testifies of both the persistence of poor 
macroeconomic conditions in the Eurozone (EZ) and a major change in the 
stance of the ECB with respect to its conventional approach to monetary 
policy. The ECB justifies its QE programme (e.g. Draghi 2014a, b) with the 
widening gap between both the actual and the expected inflation rates vis à-
vis the official target "not exceeding but close to 2%" per year, in a context 
where the policy rate is at the zero lower bound (ZLB) and conventional 
monetary weapons have proved ineffective owing to deep "segmentation" 
and "nationalisation" of financial markets. The programme will be carried 
on at least until March 2017, and in any case until the inflation expectations 
will be on target. 
 Though supported by academic research (e.g. Bernanke and Reinhart 
2004, Eggertsson and Woodford 2004, Orphanides 2014, De Grauwe and Ji 
2015) and welcomed by most EZ governments, international partners and 
official institutions, QE is still surrounded by some scepticism. The 
assessment of QE forerunners' experience (United States, United Kingdom, 
Japan) is mixed.1 Japan has not yet escaped from its long lasting 
stagnation, and while US and UK have been doing better than the EZ over 
the last five years, the impact of their large QE programmes is unclear. 
Quite reasonably, other concomitant factors, not least the fiscal stance of 
governments, also mattered. Exactly one year after the start of the ECB 
programme, the aggressive package of additional measures adopted on 
March 10, 2016, testifies that the expected results are yet to materialise. 
Hence two questions are particularly relevant as far as the EZ is concerned. 
First, how QE is expected to work where conventional monetary policy has 
failed. Second, what the fiscal stance of governments will be vis-à-vis QE 
and the EZ rules still in place. Clearly, these questions are interconnected, 
and here we seek to provide a simple, though sufficiently detailed, macro-
policy framework to address both of them. 
                                            
1 See e.g. Cecioni et al. (2011), Gambacorta et al. (2012), Bowdler and Radia (2012), 
Driffil (2016) and the supporting documents for the ECB European Parliament 
monetary dialogue, at 
 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/econ/monetary-dialogue.html. 
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 In section 2 we begin with a preliminary discussion of QE. Therein we 
clarify the rationale for QE put forward by the ECB, and how QE can be 
viewed as a reincarnation of monetary policy as a means to increase the 
amount of money available in the economy.  We highlight that the critical 
situation in the EZ is that, whereas the policy rate is at the ZLB, the market 
nominal and real interest rates are in some countries well above zero. These 
high interest rates concur to determine persistent negative output gaps and 
deflationary expectations throughout the EZ, and they are therefore eligible 
as the intermediate target for the success of QE.  
In order to analyse the implementation and impact of QE, in section 3 we 
introduce a model of the EZ which is meant to serve three main purposes. 
First, take into account the specific features of QE in the EZ, that we 
represent in a two-country system sharing a central monetary policy. 
Second, characterise QE appropriately as an expansion of money supply, i.e. 
ECB purchases of country-denominated risky assets, aimed at closing a 
persistent deflationary gap relative to the inflation target (Borio and 
Dysiatat 2010, Altavilla et al. 2015, Driffil 2016). Third, provide a stylised 
representation of the main channels of macroeconomic and monetary 
adjustment, both domestically and across countries (e.g. in't Veld, 2013). 
Research on the "theory" of QE is in progress. One can mostly find partial 
models of monetary policy (e.g. Altavilla et al. 2015) or DSGE models with 
New Keynesian foundations and "financial frictions" (e.g. Gertler and 
Karadi 2011, Curdia and Woodford 2011, Schabert 2014).  In a view to 
balancing micro-detail and macro-parsimony, we model the EZ as the 
aggregate of two countries characterised by New Keynesian output and 
inflation equations and a Tobinian LM money market equation (e.g. Tobin 
1980, 1982) that determines each country's interest rate as a spread above 
the common policy rate.2  
This latter feature makes it explicit the financial dimension of the 
economies in the form of their representative risky assets and their degree 
of substitutability in portfolios within and across countries. At the same 
time, it allows to characterise the "portfolio channel" of QE: with the policy 
                                            
2 The insertion of the money market in the New Keynesian model is discussed in 
detail by Woodford (2008). Recent reappraisals of the Tobinian approach include 
Duca and Muellbauer (2013), Blanchard et al. (2015), Caballero et al. (2016). 
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rate at the zero lower bound, QE expands money supply throughout the EZ 
in exchange for risky assets. This approach has its own limits in that it may 
neglect important stumbling blocks in the transmission mechanism.3  
However, it neatly focuses on one of the critical points of QE: namely the 
extent to which, for a given configuration of risks, exchanges of assets for 
liquidity with the central bank are transmitted to the interest rates.   
 The model supports the ECB official view that the QE is targeted to the 
reversal of deflationary expectations. It also highlights that instrumental to 
this goal is the elimination of persistent output gaps, both at the EZ and at 
the country level, and hence the reduction of country-specific interest-rate 
spreads. We show that QE, if large enough, can succeed for the EZ as a 
whole. Section 4 nevertheless shows that the ECB cannot also close 
individual countries' output gaps, unless specific and unrealistic conditions 
are met. In this case fiscal accommodation at the country level should also 
intervene. We show that QE can enhance the effectiveness of fiscal policy, 
and therefore conclude that the coordination of fiscal and monetary policies 
is of paramount importance. Conclusions and policy implications are 
summarised in section 5. 
 
2. A preliminary note on quantitative easing 
 
Operationally, QE is a catch-all that covers a number of different 
interventions of the central bank in the money market (e.g. Bernanke and 
Reinhart 2004; Borio and Disyatat 2010). However, these interventions do 
have one common feature in that they inject additional base money into the 
system (hence the qualification "quantitative") which is reflected into an 
equal expansion of the central bank's assets (QE is often presented, as for 
example by the ECB, in terms of a target on the latter). Looking at this 
                                            
3 One is the role of bank intermediaries, particularly in the EZ (Angeloni et al. 
2003, Creel et al. 2013, Gertler and Karadi 2011, Schabert 2014). Another is factors 
(more likely to arise in connection with banks) that may weaken, or totally impair, 
the transmission mechanism, such as a "liquidity trap"  the boundless absorption 
of money supply into portfolios or the fact that expenditures of "financially 
constrained"  households and firms are insensitive to the interest rate. By ignoring 
these "frictions" we obtain a more "friendly" transmission mechanism, whereas in 
reality shocks may have greater impact, and QE less impact, than implied by the 
model. 
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common feature, QE is also dubbed as "unconventional" monetary policy 
with respect to the direct management of interest rates, with limited role of 
central bank's trading of assets, epitomised by the Taylor Rule. However, 
one may say that QE is nothing but a reincarnation of the traditional 
textbook treatment of monetary policy, the "LM model" for short, whereby 
the central bank controls "the quantity of money" (or, more precisely, the 
monetary base of which total money supply is a multiple).  
In this perspective, QE also takes on a Tobinian flavour, and it comes to 
overlap with other "non conventional" measures that not only do involve the 
dimension but also the composition of asset portfolios of both the central 
bank and its counterparties (Bernanke and Reinhart 2004; Borio and 
Dysiatat 2010). The well-known Tobinian mechanism is that, by exchanging 
some classes of assets with money in the counterparties' portfolios, the 
spread on such assets falls so that they become cheaper vehicles for 
financing expenditure. Altavilla et al. (2015) and Driffil (2016) provide 
evidence that the ECB is achieving this goal. Yet, as will be seen, this may 
not be sufficient for complete success of QE. 
The case for QE, as generally explained and communicated, is that the 
central bank wishes to achieve a policy goal that it can no longer achieve by 
means of the "conventional" policy  owing to the policy rate being at the 
"zero lower bound". Central banks that have so far engaged in QE have also 
communicated somewhat different policy goals: foster the recovery of 
economic activity, prevent a deflationary spiral, raise inflationary 
expectations, spur credit supply. In the EZ, according to the ECB, the main 
QE rationale is to stop a deflationary drift and realign inflation expectations 
with the 2% target (e.g. Draghi 2014a,b). This communication strategy is 
clearly in tune with the single mandate of the ECB for price stability. 
The New Keynesian workhorse model provides an oft-heard narrative. 
The monetary stance is considered to be restrictive when in the so-called IS 
function we have the following inequality: 
interest rate  expected inflation > equilibrium real rate, 
which at the ZLB is rewritten as 
 expected inflation > equilibrium real rate 
This inequality yields a negative output gap (aggregate demand below 
potential supply). It may occur from various combination of factors such as 
very low or negative equilibrium real rate, too low inflation target of the 
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central bank, expected inflation below target or negative (e.g. Krugman 
1998). The negative output gap, via the so-called Phillips Curve feeds back 
onto negative inflation gaps, which in turn triggers low or negative expected 
inflation in a vicious circle.  
In fact, De Grauwe and Ji (2015) and Orphanides (2014) show that in the 
EZ, while the ECB policy rate has been dwelling at the ZLB since the end of 
2012, clear symptoms of monetary restriction have developed as witnessed 
by the falling growth of base money, broad monetary aggregates and credit, 
and by, on average, high real interest rates in various countries (albeit with 
important differences) due to deflationary expectations.  
Since it is widely agreed that in the EZ bank credit is the primary source 
of private expenditure (e.g. Angeloni et al. 2003, Creel et al. 2013), Figure 1 
shows the interest rate on medium-term bank loans to non-financial 
corporations in all EZ countries in 2015, both in nominal and real terms for 
the concomitant one-year inflation rate. Recalling that the key reference 
rate for bank loans, the 3-month Euribor, remained around zero, one may 
note that: 1) nominal and real interest rates (spreads) were well above zero 
in all countries; 2) in some countries deflation made the real rate higher 
than the nominal one; 3) heterogeneity across countries was large. 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of country nominal and real interest rates of bank loans to 
non-financial firms in 2015 (average monthly values) 
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Source: ECB Statistical Warehouse, Interest Rate Statistics. Eurostat, database AMECO, 
National consumer price indexes. 
 
 6 
 
Here we meet a crucial issue, specific to the EZ, which will be pivotal in 
our subsequent treatment. Obviously, EZ output and inflation gaps are 
nothing but the result of the gaps in each country. The cause of negative 
gaps at the country level should lie in its own IS inequality, i.e. the country's 
real interest rate exceeding the equilibrium real rate. This should be the 
result of a specific spread over the policy rate charged by lenders, net of 
expected inflation:   
(policy rate + country spread)  (country) expected inflation >  
(country) equilibrium real rate 
Unless financial markets are perfectly integrated and arbitraged, and all 
countries share the same fundamentals, each country's interest rate may 
well be different from any other and from the policy rate. In fact, it is now 
well documented that the EZ financial markets have undergone a 
substantial "segmentation" in the aftermath of the crisis4. One reason, in 
terms of portfolio theory, is that asset substitutability has fallen both across 
classes of assets and, more importantly, across country denomination. These 
considerations put the QE operation in the EZ in the right perspective. 
First, for a given distribution of country spreads and inflation rates, at the 
ZLB the ECB is unable to further lower the common floor of nominal interest 
rates, with the consequence that the real interest rate in some countries 
may remain too high, generating negative output gaps and deflationary 
pressure that reverberate at the EZ level. At this point the question is: how 
can QE achieve what the direct control of the policy rate cannot?  
 
3. The model 
  
 We model the EZ as the aggregate of two open economies with 
independent governments, a common currency and a single central bank 
(ECB). In a view to balancing micro-detail and macro-parsimony, for each 
economy we re-elaborate, in a simple and manageable way, the standard 
New Keynesian macro-policy framework consisting of three equations: one 
for the goods market, one for the inflation rate, and one for the interest rate. 
                                            
4 See Abbassi et al. (2014), Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2015), Croci Angelini et al. 
(2014). 
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The latter results from a Tobinian money market that determines the 
interest rate as a spread above the common policy rate. 
The structures of the two economies (the parameters of the model and the 
latent general equilibrium values  such as potential output, the natural 
interest rate, inflation target) are alike and remain constant.5 They however 
differ in the riskiness of their representative domestic assets underlying the 
determination of the spread. 
 The EZ variables observed by the ECB are the average of the two 
countries' variables. The ECB operates at the ZLB, and QE consists of an 
expansion of money supply, i.e. purchases of country-denominated risky 
assets. Since our focus is on policy responses to shocks, the short-run 
macroeconomic adjustments are assumed to occur instantly, and we do not 
develop the dynamic behaviour of the system. The key point is the effect of 
the shock on the system, when there is no built-in mechanism of self-
adjustment except a policy action. Consequently, we run a comparative 
analysis of different policy actions.6 Unless otherwise stated, all variables 
are log-deviations from trend or equilibrium values, except interest rates 
which are expressed as spreads above the (zero) common policy rate. 
 
3.1. Output and inflation 
 For each country i = 1, 2, j = not-i, and each time unit (the time subscript 
is omitted), we first posit the following output market-clearing condition (or 
IS equation) in terms of deviation of realized output from potential output:  
(1) yi  = αp(ypi + upi) + αgdi + αxxi           αp + αg + αx = 1 
where yi is the output gap, which consists of three components, private 
domestic demand ypi, the net contribution of the public sector to domestic 
                                            
5 This is a simplifying assumption, common to this class of models that focus on 
macroeconomic shocks. However we recognise that differences in economic 
structures are important in the EZ, especially after the crisis, which also had 
structural effects, as is testified by the ongoing downward revisions of potential 
output in all countries. We shall informally discuss the consequences of structural 
differences or changes where necessary. 
6 In President Draghi's words "This orientation [of our monetary policy] implies 
that there are types of shocks that are relevant for our price stability assessment, 
and those that are not. The relevant type of shocks are those that are likely to 
persist into the medium-term and affect medium-term inflation expectations" 
(2014b, p.3).  
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demand, i.e. the government's primary deficit di, and the net contribution of 
the foreign sector, i.e. the foreign trade balance xi, each weighed by the 
respective GDP share in steady state (αp, αg, αx). In addition, an exogenous 
shock to domestic private demand upi may arrive randomly. 
 Domestic private demand is expressed as a negative function of the 
deviation of the real interest rate from the "natural rate" at which potential 
output is realised and the economy remains in steady state. In the standard 
formulation, the real interest rate is represented by the nominal policy rate 
set by the central bank net of expected inflation. As a characteristic feature 
of the EZ, we instead allow the real interest rate to differ across countries, 
by the extent of a spread si of the local nominal rate relative to the common 
policy rate, net of the local expected inflation gap ei. The latter is likewise 
the deviation of expected inflation from the EZ target; we call ei < 0 
expected deflation. Therefore,  
(2) ypi = (si  ei)  
Therefore, the country real interest rate may rise "too high" (si  ei) > 0 
relative to the given natural rate as a result of a positive spread and/or 
expected deflation.7 
 As to the public sector, the public primary deficit di is the deviation from 
its steady-state value, which is set to zero. This is the net contribution of the 
public sector being the difference between additional demand created by 
expenditure for goods and services and its subtraction due to taxation. 
Following the EZ policy framework (e.g. EU Commission 2013), we 
distinguish between a discretionary and a cyclical component of the primary 
deficit. For simplicity we attribute the cyclical component to the sole tax 
revenue (i.e. we ignore automatic cyclical expenditure such as 
unemployment benefits). Assuming that the government keeps a constant 
revenue/GDP rate , the actual revenue deviates from its steady-state level 
                                            
7 This formulation can be derived directly from households' choice of their optimal 
consumption path, so that they shift consumption from the present to the future 
according to their intertemporal elasticity of substitution. As to investment, in this 
class of models (e.g. Casares and McCallum 2006),  deviations of investment from 
steady state (pure capital replacement) are sensitive to the same variable as 
consumption, via Tobin's q, net of the adjustment cost component. Hence equation 
(2) may be extended to include, at least in part, the investment component of 
private demand. 
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proportionally to the output gap, yi. Then we treat the discretionary 
component as a change in public expenditure, or fiscal shock ugi.  
(3) di = ugi  yi 
EZ governments also face a mandatory deficit constraint, but for the time 
being it is not necessary to model it explicitly (we shall return to this point 
in section 4.3).  
 The foreign trade balance xi  consists of two components, intra and extra-
EZ, with respective shares of  and 1-. Intra-EZ trade depends on the 
change in the intra-EZ real exchange rate (j  i), given by the relative 
inflation gaps in the two countries, and on the business cycle in the two 
countries (yj  yi). As to extra-EZ trade, we assume that world prices and 
output remain on trend, so that the only relevant variable is the change in 
the extra-EZ real exchange rate, given by the rate of change of the euro 
exchange rate  ( > 0 denotes depreciation) vis-à-vis the local inflation gap. 
We assume unit elasticity of all the trade components with the relevant 
variables.  Therefore,  
(4) xi = ((j  i) + (yj  yi)) + (1  )((  i)  yi)    
The euro exchange rate is driven by (deviations from) uncovered interest 
parity with the rest of the world (ROW), i.e. 
(5)  =  (rw  r  + e) 
where r is (the change in) the EZ policy rate, rw is the equivalent for the 
ROW and e is the expected depreciation rate of the euro. Thus, the euro 
depreciates to the extent that rw + e > r, where  measures the responsi-
veness of world capital movements to the interest-rate differential (for 
simplicity, we set  = 1).  As to e, we adopt the "PPP view" according to 
which exchange-rate expectations are driven by the inflation differential   
w ; this is zero when inflation is on trend in the EZ and the ROW. In a 
world at the ZLB, differences of level and change in the policy rates are 
negligible, rw  r  0. Assuming that world inflation remains on trend, w = 
0, the euro exchange rate is fully driven by the inflation gap in the EZ,  = , 
that is deflation  < 0 makes the euro appreciate, and vice versa. 
 The supply side of each economy is represented by the relationship 
between the output gap and the deviations of inflation from its expected 
value. According to the standard New Keynesian Phillips Curve (PC), that 
assumes monopolistic competition with sticky prices, the current inflation 
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gap is determined by its expected value and the current output gap, i.e. in 
our terms, 
(6) i = ei + yi + ui 
where  is a discount factor,  is the elasticity of price changes to output 
gaps and ui is a white-noise random shock. The rational expectation (RE) of 
the inflation gap is therefore the statistical expected value of (6): 
(7) ei = E(i) = E( )1 iy

   
where E() denotes the unbiased statistical expected value. Clearly, in this 
setup, the RE of the inflation gap is uniquely conditioned by the statistical 
expected value of output gaps. The key implication is that ei is zero only if 
the price setters can rationally expect the output gap to be zero. As shown 
by Woodford (2003, ch. 3), the standard Taylor rule ensures that the output 
gap is zero when inflation is on target. This provides the anchor for the 
expected inflation in general equilibrium, so that i can be gauged as a 
reversible fluctuation around the central bank's target, which supports the 
RE that ei = E(i) = 0.  
 This RE equilibrium can be upset as the agents cease to have a rational 
basis to believe that E(yi) = 0. To see this point in detail, let yei denote a 
generic expectation of the output gap and substitute it for E(yi) in equation 
(7). To the extent that yei   0, the actual inflation gap becomes 
(8) 1(1 ) ei i iy y u         
and if yei  < 0, the actual inflation gap takes a negative drift. Therefore, the 
concern for a persistent, expectation-driven, deflationary bias in the 
economy has little to do with exogenous shocks to the PC and much to do 
with the entrenchment of the belief that the output gap will remain 
negative. To pin down this phenomenon with observable data in a simple 
way, let the belief yei be the expected value of the output gap persisting with 
probability p or reverting with probability 1p, i.e. yei = pyi.8 As a result we 
can write   
(9) ei = yi 
with   p(1 )1 measuring the weight of persistence expectations (PE).9  
                                            
8 Hence 1-p can be interpreted as a measure of the confidence in the central bank's 
control over the business cycle. 
9 In applied quantitative macro-models  is set close to 1. Note therefore that even 
a small persistence probability p may magnify  substantially. 
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The actual inflation gap thus becomes  
(10) i = y yi + ui 
where y   + .  
Note that, as yei = E(yi) = 0 supports the zero-gaps RE equilibrium ei = 
E(i) = 0, so a persistent output gap, such that eventually yei = E(yi) = yi 
with p1, supports another, nonzero-gaps, RE equilibrium where y  
/(1), and ei = E(i) = y yi. So long as 0 < p < 1, the economy is not in RE 
equilibrium (ei  E(i)); however, we shall allow for this possibility by using 
(9) as the equation of the expectation formation, so that we can examine two 
scenarios: the "normal" one, when  = 0 and the ECB should prevent the 
formation of nonzero-gaps expectations  by consistently realising E(y) = 0, 
and the  "persistence" one, where  > 0 and the ECB should curb existing 
PE. 
  Substituting equations from (2) to (10) into (1) we obtain the following 
bilateral10 form of the IS equation: 
(11) yi = [ 'si + pupi + αgugi  αxui + α'x(yj  + j) + α"x)]y 
where '  αp, α'x  αx, α"x  αx(1) and y = [1 + αg + x(1 + )  
('x)]1 
 We have thus a detailed account of (changes in) the various internal and 
external variables and shocks that may generate e.g. a negative output gap 
under the normal condition that y > 0. Given the respective parameters, 
the impact of these events is larger the smaller is the magnitude of the 
common denominator (or the larger the respective "multiplier" of each 
shock). 
 
3.2. The money market and the interest-rate spread 
In normal times, the policy rate set by the ECB affects the demand side of 
each country via the real interest rate, while the inflation target provides 
the anchor for the expected inflation. However, here we have to deal with 
"special times" in which the policy rate is at the ZLB, and the central bank 
deliberately turns the Taylor Rule off and shifts to QE with the 
unconditional objective of closing the inflation gap. We should model this 
new monetary policy stance from the point of view of each country in the EZ.
 In the first place, we need to introduce the money market of each country. 
                                            
10 That is, a quasi-reduced form of yi where yj appears explicitly. 
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A variety of microfoundations are available. For the reasons discussed in 
section 2, we find it suitable a Tobinian foundation on portfolio theory (e.g. 
Tobin 1980, 1982; see Appendix A1). Key to this approach is the degree of 
substitutability between money and assets and across different assets 
depending on outstanding stocks, their riskiness, and risk preferences. 
What configuration is most accurate is a thorny empirical issue, but as 
discussed in section 2, it is now largely believed that, whereas the pre-crisis 
regime of the EZ would approach "perfect substitutability", after the crisis 
the EZ capital markets have become significantly "segmented", which we 
translate into the  assumptions that (i) there is a segmentation between 
within-country and cross-country substitution, and (ii) assets are imperfect 
substitutes across countries. Like Blanchard et al. (2015), we assume that 
money demand in each country is expressed by domestic agents who seek to 
optimise their money holdings vis-à-vis interest-bearing domestic assets in 
view of their non-financial transactions. Besides there are EZ "global 
investors" who seek pure financial returns by optimising their portfolios of 
assets from different countries, which gives rise to intra-EZ capital 
movements.11  
 Therefore, we first have a money demand equation for each country such 
that the rate of change in money demand results from 
(12) mdi = i + my yi  mssi + umi 
The inflation and output gaps, i and yi, trigger excess demand for 
transaction balances with positive elasticity. The interest rate on domestic 
assets (i.e. the country spreads on the common policy rate, si) is the 
opportunity cost of money, and it triggers substitution between money and 
the domestic assets according to the semi-elasticity ms. Finally, money 
demand can be shifted by exogenous shock umi. Portfolio theory shows that 
money-asset substitutability is poorer (si is smaller) when risk and/or risk 
aversion are higher. In turn, these conditions are more likely when the 
underlying asset stock is high (see Appendix A1).  
 Money supply in each country has two sources (e.g. Goodhart 1989; 
Tamborini 2001). The first is direct injection from the union's money 
market, i. The second is the share of the union's money stock that is 
circulated by way of intra-union payment imbalances bi, so that surplus 
                                            
11 For simplicity we exclude non-EZ assets. 
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countries gain money to the expenses of deficit countries.12 These 
imbalances are the result of the current account (which for simplicity we 
identify with the trade component only) and capital movements i.e. 
(13) bi = ((j  i) + (yj  yi)) + bs(si  sj) 
The trade account has already been defined above, whereas capital 
movements are driven towards one country or the other depending on the 
interest-rate differential (i.e. the respective spread over the common policy 
rate) given the degree of cross-country asset substitution measured by the 
parameter bs. If they are perfect substitutes, we are in the case of "perfect 
capital mobility" in the Mundell-Fleming tradition. Instead, given risk 
aversion, assets from different countries are imperfect substitutes 
depending on differences in relative riskiness and outstanding stocks which 
may lower the magnitude of bs (see Appendix A1).13 Notice that here the 
capital market operates in a "normal" situation in which a higher spread 
signals a higher risk premium, but it attracts capital inflows and does not 
trigger a capital flight to safety. Therefore, the money supply flowing into in 
each country can be specified as follows: 
(14) msi = bi  + i 
whereas in the aggregate bi = 0 and i = , where  is the rate of money 
creation in the EZ.14  
 At this point, we are in a position to examine how the money market 
conditions affect the country spreads. Let us compute the value of si that 
satisfies the money market equilibrium mdi = msi. The result is  
(15) si = [(my + )yi + (1+)i  (yj + j) + bssj + (umi  i)]s 
                                            
12 As to extra-union imbalances, in the EZ they are pooled together by the ECB 
and affect its stock of official reserves and (possibly) money supply. In practice, 
being on a free float, this component is almost negligible. 
13 In addition, cross-country substitutability may be further impaired to the extent 
that international investors discounts specific cross-border risks or displays "home 
bias" (i.e. risk aversion is higher or lower for assets issued in specific countries) 
14 i is also a simple and straightforward way to capture the role of the banking 
system. Note, then, that i =  can be read bi-directionally. From the right to the 
left it indicates how the money creation by the ECB is allocated to the single 
countries. This reading is appropriate to QE and we shall use it subsequently. 
However, in "conventional times", when the ECB sets the terms of borrowing in the 
money market and stands by, we can read from left to right the total amount of 
money creation due to each country's banking system borrowing in the union's 
money market, or the extent of endogenous money creation.   
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where s = [bs + ms]1 
Each country spread depends on the output and inflation gaps of both 
countries, the spread of the other country, and its own money demand and 
supply shocks. The quantitative impact of these variables on the spread 
mainly depends on two parameters, ms and bs, which respectively measure 
asset-substitutability within and across countries. The change in the spread 
is greater the smaller they are, i.e. with poorer substitutability. All this 
supports the concern that high-risk and high-debt (private and/or public) 
countries have a spread strongly sensitive to shocks.  
In this type of model money demand shocks may be an important source 
of macroeconomic instability, and they may capture phenomena that have 
played a role during the development of the financial crisis, such as a 
sudden surge in liquidity preference umi > 0 that pushes the spread up. 
However, money-security substitution also implies that the money market 
equilibrium should be consistent with the security market equilibrium, and, 
by Walras Law, excess demand in the money market should be equal to 
excess supply in the security market, and vice versa (Tobin, 1969).  For our 
purposes, we focus on public bonds as representative of the security market. 
Therefore, excess supply of public bonds, due to a government deficit, should 
be matched by excess demand for money, or di = umi. We can thus  see that 
the country spread is increasing in the its public deficit, a fundamental 
assumption at the roots of the EZ design. To the extent that the spreads are 
correlated (bs > 0), the spread in one country is also increasing in the other's 
public deficit, another concern that has shaped the EZ design.  
 Money supply shocks are particularly important as they are the vehicle of 
the transmission of central operations to the countries. We see that these 
shocks have the same and symmetric effect as the demand ones in both 
countries.  This fact has two interesting consequences. The first is that an 
increase in money supply is more effective on the spread precisely when and 
where it is needed, i.e. when si is large because ms is small (domestic asset 
substitutability is low) and issuing new liabilities to finance expenditure is 
more costly. The second is the case in which i = di, i.e.  money financing of 
the public deficit with null effect on the spread. Note that the cross-border 
transmission channel now operates for the good of the other country too.  
 
3.3 The three equations at the country level 
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 Each country is characterised by three equations determining (yi, i, si) 
for any shock (upi, ugi, ui, j, ). These equations are crucial since they 
provide the foundation of the whole QE policy, as we shall see in detail.  
 In the first place, in principle for any exogenous shock there exists an 
optimal decentralised policy response, either monetary or fiscal, i.e. a pair 
*i and/or u*gi such that i = 0.15 Therefore, the centralised policy response 
by the ECB should rest on the premise that the decentralised one is 
unfeasible. On the monetary side, the national banking systems may be 
unable, or unwilling, to borrow from the ECB at the given policy rate so as 
to expand domestic money supply as much as necessary. On the fiscal side, 
governments may be inhibited, or unwilling, to activate the necessary fiscal 
stimuli. 
For the sake of concreteness, we have sought to provide a tentative 
quantification of the parameters of the three equations based on available 
direct or indirect sources (see Appendix A2). This is done just for illustrative 
purposes, with no claim of rigorous measurement. The results are reported 
below, for the base case in which there are no expectations of persistent 
output gap, and the case of a 5% probability of persistence in parentheses 
underneath. 
  yi =  0.127si + 0.636upi + 0.523ugi  0.035ui + 0.023(yj  + j) + 0.012 
       (0.133)     (0.663)      (0.545)      (0.036)      (0.024)              (0.013) 
(16) i = 0.086yi + ui 
       (0.515) 
  si = 1.245(yi + i)  0.495(yj + j) + 0.4sj + 0.75(ugi  i) 
  
To begin with the IS function, the parameters share the common 
multiplier y smaller than 1 (0.872 in the base case) indicating the shock-
absorbing capacity of the system. As to fiscal shocks, the parameter is in 
line with the pre-crisis consensus that set fiscal multipliers in the range 
between 0.5 and 1.16 The PC function has quite a small output elasticity, as 
is standard in estimated or calibrated New Keynesian models.  
                                            
15 Note that decentralized policy responses should be coordinated owing to their 
reciporcal spillovers. 
16 As is well known, the pre-crisis consensus on fiscal multipliers has been 
challenged by a number of empirical studies pointing to a large upgrading of 
estimates well above 1 or even 2. Here the difference with the traditional 
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The LM function shows that the spread is highly sensitive to all shocks. 
This matches a well-known empirical regularity about the volatility of 
interest rates during the crisis. Our model (see above 3.2 and Appendix A1) 
captures one main reason for high sensitivity, namely poor asset 
substitutability, reflected in the relative small magnitude of the parameters 
of the LM function found in the crisis period (see Appendix A2) such that 
the common multiplier s is barely below unity (0.75), i.e. portfolio 
adjustments provide little shock absorption. The other side of the coin is 
that the cross-country transmission of spreads is of limited extent (0.4). 
Combined with poor asset substitutability, the quantitative importance of 
the intra-EZ BP channel of the spread is confirmed. A large part of the 
sizeable increase of the spread during a domestic boom is due to the 
deterioration of the BP (contraction of domestic money supply vis-à-vis 
increase in the demand for transaction balances) whereas the entire 
decrease of the spread triggered by a foreign boom is due to the 
improvement of the BP (expansion of domestic money supply). Exogenous 
shocks to domestic money supply, too, have an important impact on the 
country spread. 
 It can be seen that the introduction of even a small probability assigned 
to persistence of output/inflation gaps makes a nontrivial difference for the 
IS and PC functions. The IS function is affected, becoming more sensitive to 
all shocks, because its common multiplier is amplified (from 0.872 to 0.908), 
while the PC output elasticity rises substantially. For a given recessionary 
shock, the negative inflation gap grows much larger.   
 
4. QE at work 
4.1. The ECB and the EZ economy as a whole 
In order to introduce the ECB's behaviour we should now move to the EZ 
level. The correct road towards the EZ level starts from the three-equations 
systems of each country.  In fact, the ECB should know and exploit the exact 
structure of the transmission mechanism of QE, by which we mean the 
_____________________________ 
 
Keynesian multiplier typically greater than 1, is the absence of components of 
private expenditure directly dependent on GDP discussed previously.. 
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whole set of country equations and their parameters resulting in the EZ 
economy as a whole. Now, upon solving for the two countries' endogenous 
variables, and taking their average values, we obtain the following EZ 
system in matrix format (EZ variables are denoted by non-indexed symbols)  
(17) [y, , s]' = A[up, ug, u, ]'  
The three endogenous EZ variables result to be determined by the 
average shocks to aggregated demand, fiscal policy, inflation, and by the 
rate of money creation . As to the exchange rate, we have assumed that it 
is driven by the EZ inflation gap (see section 3.1), i.e. , so that it, too, is 
endogenised. The coefficient matrix A conveys important information. 
 First, substantial structural uncertainty exists in that the signs of all 
coefficients are ambiguous. This is the consequence of two phenomena. One 
is that each shock has both a direct impact on the correspondent endogenous 
variable and an indirect effect via the concomitant adjustment of the other 
endogenous variables.17 The second is reciprocal spillovers that amplify the 
simple aggregation of country effects. To see this, start again from each 
country's IS and suppose that a slump occurs in country j, yj < 0, while 
nothing happens in country i. Then the EZ output loss will not just be yj/2 
but larger, owing to the reciprocal spillovers between the two countries. The 
same occurs with shocks to spreads, as can be seen by means of the LM 
equation (15): an increase in the spread of country j also raises the spread of 
country i through the BP channel, so that the increase of the average spread 
is magnified.  
Assuming that the indirect effects and the spillover effects are sufficiently 
small, the coefficient signs are those reported in system (18). In parentheses 
we also report the figures obtained with our empirical parameters, which 
are indeed consistent with this assumption. Since the expectations of 
persistent deflation play an important role in the ECB communication, 
system (18) reports figures for this case.   
 
                                            
17 For instance, a negative demand shock up < 0 affects the output gap y directly 
and the spread s indirectly. The direct effect generates a negative output gap, 
which also reduces the spread. The final effect remains negative on both y and s if 
its direct impact on y is larger than the recovery of output due to the concomitant 
fall of s. 
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(18)  
               +
(.936) (.413) ( .356) (.179)
           
(.482) (.213) (.817) (.092)
                 
(0.958) (3.287) (2.504) ( 1.252)
' 'p gy s u u u
  

   
   

                  
 
 
4.2. The mechanics of QE and its policy implications 
 System (18) may be useful to understand why QE may be necessary in 
the first place. The EZ inflation gap  can be negative after a private 
demand fall up < 0, a fiscal contraction ug < 0, and/or because of a direct 
deflationary shock u < 0. Consider up < 0: it has a large impact on both y 
and , though s is reduced in parallel. Commensurate (about twice the 
shock) coordinated fiscal stimuli ugi > 0 would be the most effective response 
for correcting both recession and deflation; yet, if compatible with fiscal 
rules, their drawback is a substantial rise in s, which may be detrimental 
for countries with high debt. With fiscal stimuli tightly constrained, a policy 
of generalised "competitive" deflation across countries u < 0  would reduce s 
but it might nonetheless put monetary policy under stress, giving limited 
support to y (one third of the shock) via the extra-EZ trade18 while 
magnifying the fall of . Indeed, QE  > 0, appears as the weapon of last 
resort. Notably, QE has a substantial effect on s whereas the effect on y  is 
of lesser magnitude, and the final effect on  is rather small (indeed, the 
transmission mechanism is  s  y  ). The ultimate reason is that the 
standard quantification of the slope of the PC is in the range of few 
centesimal points, although, as previously seen, the persistence expectations 
raise it substantially. The immediate policy implication is that QE should be 
activated on a large scale. 
 In this setup, the ECB has the single instrument  for one (unconditional) 
official target: close the negative inflation gap . In principle, this appears to 
be a problem with a well-defined solution. Let us work it out in detail with 
reference to the empirical coefficient values in system (18). For each of the 
shocks up, ug, and u,  we can compute the optimal *, i.e. the rate of money 
creation that sets the inflation gap to zero, and gauge its effect on the 
                                            
18 Generalized deflation has a zero-sum effect on intra-EZ trade. 
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remaining endogenous variables (see Table 1). In all cases, a positive * is 
warranted, with three qualifications. First, the quantitative responses are 
different, and the ECB should identify the type of shock originating the 
inflation gap. Second, the more the PC is flat, the larger * should be; hence, 
it may be comforting to see that in the presence of deflationary expectations, 
which make the PC steeper, QE is both necessary and more efficient. Third, 
apart from quantitative differences of QE, the overall macroeconomic effects 
are also notably different for different shocks. 
 
Table 1. Optimal * and its effects on the other endogenous variables (p=0.05) 
 up<0 ug<0 u<0 
* 5.2 2.3  9.6 
y  0.0 0.0  1.9 
s -7.5 -6.2 -13.6 
 
 If QE reacts to up< 0, y is also closed and s is reduced. This outcome is 
entirely consistent with the logic of targeting both the actual and the 
expected inflation gap. It is often argued that the relevant shock is u< 0 due 
to the oil price fall;  if this is the case, then QE should be larger, s should fall 
more and y should become positive as long as the shock is not reversed. This 
is essentially the "overshooting" policy strategy envisaged by Eggertsson 
and Woodford (2004). 
 Our conclusion is that a QE programme of the appropriate size can, in 
principle, succeed for the EZ as a whole. However, it should be considered 
that, as said at the beginning, the transmission mechanisms in our model 
can in reality be impaired by a number of factors that may prevent the 
relevant spreads from falling all the way (e.g. in the credit markets) or make 
private expenditure insensitive to the fall of spreads. These factors are not 
easily overcome by merely expanding the scale of QE. Here we shall focus on 
another stumbling block that may lie in the way of QE success. 
   
4.3. Asymmetric shocks and the need for fiscal adjustment 
 Let QE be successful for the EZ as whole (i.e. on average). Yet remember 
that what surfaces at the EZ level is the result of what is going on at the 
country level, which crucially depends on:  
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 the degree of correlation of shocks across countries (we denote with cji  
[1, 1] the extent of a shock in country j given a shock in country i) 
 the distribution of money creation between the countries (we denote with i 
the share of country i in the rate of money creation)  
Even in our (most favourable) case in which the countries are structurally 
equal, the EZ average outcome exactly reflects the country-level outcomes 
only if a new "divine coincidence" occurs19 : 
 the relevant shock is symmetric, cji = 1 
 each country receives the same share of aggregate money creation, i = 
0.5 
 Let us consider as an example the case of up< 0, and  compare the 
outcomes of the centralised QE in Table 1, with those shown in Table 2 for 
an asymmetric shock to country 1. In the first place, asymmetry entails that 
the average EZ shock is just one half of the shock to country 1. Then, the 
equal distribution of * between the two countries implies that country 1 is 
underadjusted and country 2 is overadjusted, that is, QE is too little for 
country 1 and too much for country 2. In particular, note that the 
stabilisation of  and y at the EZ level hides residual negative output and 
inflation gaps in country 1 exactly matched by positive gaps in country 2. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Optimal centralised solution and its effects at the country level 
(asymmetric shock up1 = 1%, c21 = 0, 1= 2 = 0.5)  
*  2.6 1   1.3 2 1.3 
  0.0 1 0.2 2  0.2 
y  0.0 y1 0.4 y2   0.4 
s 3.8 s1 4.4 s2 3.1 
 Analogous result occurs if we let the shock and QE be symmetric but the 
asymmetry is structural (e.g. QE is less effective in one country than in the 
other). Pragmatically, it may be argued that the centralised QE is better 
than nothing, for otherwise both countries would suffer from worse deflation 
and output gaps. However, in order to unbundle the average EZ variables 
                                            
19 "Divine coincidence" is a well-known term coined by Blanchard and Galì (2007) 
to denote the joint stabilisation of output and inflation in the New Keynesian 
models 
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and obtain the desired results at the country level, the ECB should know 
and exploit a huge amount of local information and should control the 
country distribution of the aggregate money creation. Both requirements 
may be hardly feasible in practice, but, more importantly, they may be 
objected as being in contrast with the ECB mandate that prevents ad hoc 
monetary policy actions for specific countries. In fact, the ECB has 
announced that it will control for the country distribution of QE in 
consideration of each country's share in the ECB capital. Yet this criterion is 
utterly unrelated to the optimal money creation at the country level20. It 
may well be the case that more money creation will flow where it is needed 
the least.  Therefore, non trivial problems of consistency arise for the correct 
design of the QE programme. 
 In the case of undesirable outcomes at the country level, the intervention 
of  last resort is fiscal accommodation. This can consistently be obtained 
from the three-equation systems at the country level (16). With our 
parameters and a private demand shock, the fiscal response in each country 
that drives its own inflation and output gaps to zero, given the country 
distribution of QE, looks like the following 
(19) u*gi = 1.751upi   0.15upj + 0.162ugj   0.435i  0.289j 
 The first important feature to note is that we are in the presence of a 
coordinated solution. The fiscal response of each country should also take 
into account the fiscal response, the demand shock, and the QE share of the 
other. Note the positive parameter of ugj in the equation: it draws attention 
to the fact that the fiscal stimulus in country j may have a negative spillover 
onto country i, so that the latter's fiscal stimulus should be enlarged. In this 
model, the negative spillover is due to the rise of the spreads in both 
countries. Hence, the negative side of fiscal accommodation to QE may be 
that the spreads rise instead of falling. On the other hand, the negative 
parameters of i and j in equation (19) confirm that the concomitant QE, 
exerting some positive effect on inflation and output and restoring asset 
substitution, reduces both the extent of fiscal adjustments and their impact 
                                            
20 Notice in addition that the "country-specific" QE takes the form of national bond 
purchase, but nothing guarantees that the owners of those bonds are also residents 
of the country, so that money creation may not happen there. 
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on the spreads. Hence, QE may effectively relax the constraints that may 
prevent the decentralised fiscal solution.  
 As to the  role of the ECB, it appears as the leader-player who chooses its 
own optimal QE for the EZ as a whole irrespective of the country responses. 
It is entitled to do so because the aggregate effect of the latter is neutral on 
the EZ target of zero inflation gap, though it is not neutral on the average 
spread. Hence, the combination of QE with fiscal accommodation does not 
necessarily entail a threat on monetary dominance. To have an idea of the 
magnitudes at stake compare Table 2 with Table 3, which is obtained from 
equation (19).  
 
Table 3. Optimal centralised solution and fiscal accommodation at the country level 
(asymmetric shock up1 = 1%, c21 = 0, 1= 2 = 0.5)  
* 2.6 1 1.3 2 1.3 
  u*g1 0.69 u*g2 -0.68 
 0.0 1 0.0 2 0.0 
y 0.0 y1 0.0 y2 0.0 
s -3.2 s1 -3.6 s2 -4.7 
 
 The result is that country 1, hit by the asymmetric shock, should have an 
additional fiscal expansion, whereas country 2 should have a contraction by 
almost the same amount. All gaps are driven to zero, the spread falls less 
than the average in country 1 and more than the average in country 2.  
 Note that in the absence of QE, i.e. if each country were to use the sole 
fiscal policy, the result would be u*g1 = 1.78, u*g2 = 0.45 indicating a larger 
fiscal expansion in both countries, associated with higher, instead of lower, 
spreads. Therefore, as pointed out above, QE contributes to country 
stabilisation by allowing less recourse to fiscal policy. 
 The optimal fiscal accommodation in each country may of course be 
attainable to the extent that the budget constraint set by the current 
Treaties is not violated. If the constraint is binding for one or more 
countries, the imbalances left over by the centralised QE would remain 
uncorrected implying further adjustments that we leave for further 
analysis. 
 
5. Conclusions 
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 The EZ model presented in this paper supports the ECB official view that 
QE is both necessary and more effective when persistent deflationary 
expectations are in place and risky asset substitutability is impaired. We 
have shown that a QE programme of the appropriate size can succeed for 
the EZ as a whole, with some caveats.  The complete success of QE depends 
on closing the negative output gaps at the EZ level as well as at the country 
level. This condition may materialise thanks to a new "divine coincidence": 
1) all countries are alike, 2) the shock originating deflation is symmetric, 3) 
the cross-country distribution of QE is symmetric. Otherwise, the old "one 
size does not fit all" curse will materialise: violation of any of the previous 
conditions implies that QE (if large enough) will work for the EZ on average, 
but not for the single countries. In practice we know that the ECB has some 
control on the distribution of QE, by and large proportional to the countries' 
shares in its capital. Yet this distribution criterion is utterly unrelated to 
the problem to be solved. 
 President Draghi's repeated warning is right: monetary policy alone may 
be insufficient; coordinated national fiscal stimuli may be necessary. We 
have shown that such a coordinated solution exists, taking the country 
effects of QE as given, and that QE indeed mitigates the extent of  fiscal 
deficits that would otherwise be necessary. This is clearly important, given 
the normative or market limitations to fiscal policy, which may by 
themselves make QE necessary in the first place. By contrast, with 
normative limitations to the coordinated fiscal accommodation still binding, 
QE may be doomed to failure at the country level with possibly further 
repercussions that deserve to be examined by additional research. 
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Appendix 
 
A1. Portfolio foundation of the LM function 
 In order to stylise some key features of the current financial environment 
of the EZ, we distinguish between domestic and global investors (see also 
Blanchard et al., 2015). Domestic investors are mostly concerned with 
optimising their portfolios in view of their non-financial transactions in the 
domestic economy. To this end, the domestic investors in each country (i = 1, 
2) can combine zero-interest money (Mi) with an interest-bearing domestic 
representative asset (Ai) while taking into account the price level (Pi) and 
the volume of non-financial transactions (Yi). Global investors are instead 
concerned with optimising pure financial portfolios all across the EZ by 
combining the representative asset of each country. Hence, portfolio choices 
of global investors generate capital movements across countries.21 
 Risk characteristics of domestic and global investors may possibly be 
different, but this detail is unnecessary here, so we assume a single typical 
exponential utility function of wealth, with constant absolute risk aversion  
 [0,1]. Provided that returns to assets are normally distributed N  (Ri, 
2i), each investor maximises his/her expected wealth E(W) when the 
function 
   F = E(W)  (/2)2W  
is maximal. 
 The money demand and capital movement functions in the text can be 
understood as rates of variation around the optimal portfolio allocations to 
be derived below, for a given constant wealth endowment. 
Domestic investors 
 Domestic investors own a real amount of wealth given by 
   Wi/Pi= Ai/Pi + Mi/Pi 
Given Pi, its expected value is given by the expected return to the asset 
stock RiAi net of the costs of non-financial transactions Yi. These are 
assumed to be quadratic in the difference between Yi and real money 
holdings Mi/Pi. Therefore, the optimal money holding results from 
                                            
21 The country location of global investors is immaterial because portfolio shifts 
imply that sales of asset i (capital outflows from country i) are matched by 
purchases of asset j (capital inflows in country j). 
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maximising the function F net of transaction costs under the wealth 
constraint, i.e. 
   2 2 21max ( / / ) ( / ) ( / / )
2 2i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
F R W P M P Y M P W P M P         
which yields 
    221* / /1i i i i i i iiM P Y R W P       
    21* / /1i i i i i iiA P R Y W P     
 We thus obtain the standard money demand function which is 
homogenous of degree 1 in the price level, increasing in the volume of non-
financial transactions, decreasing in the expected rate of return to the asset 
(interest rate for short),  plus a positive wealth effect. As said in the text, 
money-asset substitutability, or the responsiveness of  money demand to the 
interest rate, falls as the riskiness of the asset and/or the investors' risk 
aversion rise. Note that in this particular formulation the non-financial 
transactions and the interest rate have the same coefficient. In the text we 
have posited the more general case in which the two coefficients may be 
different. 
Global investors 
 Global investors aim to maximise the value of their wealth given by 
   W = A1 + A2 
It is sufficient to consider nominal wealth because by assumption global 
investors' geographical location is irrelevant (and hence so are the location 
of their personal consumption and the specific price level in any location). 
Maximisation of the function F under the constraint W yields the demands 
for the two asset stocks: 
   A*1 = 
1
a b (R1  R2) + 
b
a b W 
   A*2 = 
1
a b (R2  R1) + 
a
a b W 
where a = (21  12), b = (22  12).  
 Again, we obtain the standard portfolio result whereby the demand for 
each asset is proportional to its own interest-rate differential plus a wealth 
effect. Cross-country asset substitutability is determined by the parameters 
a and b, i.e. the risk parameters of the two assets and the degree of risk 
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aversion of investors. The responsiveness of each asset to its own interest-
rate differential is symmetric, which implies that as R1 (R2) rises relative to 
R2 (R1) the demand for A1 increases (decreases) and that for A2 decreases 
(increases) by the same amount. This change in asset holdings generate a 
capital movement from country 1 to country 2.  
On this account, it is interesting to note that the optimal asset holdings 
imply the following interest-rate differential  
  R1  R2 = aA*1  bA*2 
Hence any non-zero spread may develop according to combinations of: (i) the 
sign and size of the risk factors a and b, (ii) the outstanding stocks of the 
two assets, i.e. the so-called relative supply effect. Though various 
combinations are possible, typically asset A1 will pay a spread over asset A2 
to the extent that it is more risky (21 > 22  a > b) and/or it is in larger 
supply 
  
A2. Parameters of the model 
 
Parameter  Source 
p = 0.73 Private expenditure/GDP EZ average value 2000-14, Eurostat, 
AMECO database 
g = 0.23 Public sector contribution to 
GDP 
EZ average value 2000-14, Eurostat, 
AMECO database 
x = 0.04 Foreign sector contribution to 
GDP 
EZ average value 2000-14, Eurostat, 
AMECO database 
 = 0.66 Intra-EZ share of foreign 
trade 
EZ average value 2000-14, Eurostat, 
AMECO database 
 = 0.45 Total revenue/GDP General government, EZ average 
value 2000-14, Eurostat, AMECO 
database 
 = 0.2 Interest-rate elasticity of 
private demand Garnier and Wilhelmsen (2005) 
 = 0.99 Discount factor Standard value in literature 
 = 0.086 Output-gap elasticity of 
inflation 
Implied by the Calvo equation, given 
 and 75% of non-adjusted prices 
(e.g. Smets and Vouters (2003), Luk 
and Vines (2015)) 
p = 0, 0.05 Probability of output gap 
persistence  
bs/(ms+bs) 
= 0.4 
 
Coefficient of the spread in 
country i w.r.t. the spread in 
country j 
Ehrman and Fratzscher (2015), i = 
Italy, j = Germany 
my=1 Income elasticity of money Calza et al. (2001), Beyer (2009) 
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ms = 0.8 
demand 
Interest-rate semi-elasticity 
of money demand 
 
